Committee
Report on the New Jersey Naval Militia Joint Command (NJNMJC) to The
Adjutant General
The Adjutant General Report to Legislature on
the NJ Naval Militia Joint Command
5 April 2005
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Honorable Richard J. Codey
Senate President
449 Mount Pleasant Avenue
West Orange, NJU 07052 |
Honorable Albio Sires
Speaker, New Jersey Assembly
303 58th Street
West New York, NJ 07093 |
Dear Senator Codey and Speaker Sires:
Subject: The Adjutant General Report to the Legislature
on the New Jersey Naval Militia Joint Command
In January 2004, P.L. 2004 c. 300 was enacted requiring the New Jersey
State Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (DMAVA) to determine
whether a viable and clearly defined mission exists for the New Jersey
Naval Militia Joint Command (NJNMJC). The statute requires that if a
mission exists for the NJNMJC that it be explained and that personnel
and material assets required to fulfill the mission be outlined. If it
is determined that no mission exists, justification needs to be provided
to the Legislature.
As The Adjutant General, I considered a number
of reports in order to make my recommendation to the Legislature on
the mission of the NJNMJC.
The first was a report prepared by members of DMAVA who were primarily
of members of the NJNMJC, a report prepared by the New Jersey State Police
(NJSP) which was requested by the Domestic Security Preparedness Task
Force, and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the U.S.
Coast Guard and the NJSP. All three reports are attached. Although the
DMAVA review identified a waterborne mission for the NJNMJC, I have concluded
that there have been a significant number of changes to the oversight
and management of homeland security issues and that the NJSP do have
primary responsibility for the waterborne mission. In addition, there
are limited resources in the State’s budget which should not be
divided between two entities (NJSP and NJNMJC) providing a similar waterborne
mission. Therefore, I could not, in good faith, identify a clearly defined
mission for the NJNMJC. Following is a detailed discussion of my review
and conclusions.
History
The NJNMJC was re-activated in 1999 by Governor
Christine Todd-Whitman in a letter directing the Adjutant General to
form such an entity by organizing
the New Jersey Naval Militia and the New Jersey State Guard into one body.
Essentially, the NJNMJC is a hybrid organization with the 1st Battalion
being a true naval militia comprised of 95% actively drilling Navy and
Marine Corps reservists, the 2nd Battalion performing as an “operational
Naval State Guard” and the 3rd Battalion providing support and auxiliary
functions as multi-service State Guard. The NJNMJC maintains an MOA with
the Coast Guard that gives permission for reservists to drill and cites
broad support areas where the NJNMJC could be augmentees. During rescue
and recovery operations for September 11, 2001, a number of NJNMJC personnel
were activated and utilized extensively during the period of September
2001 through January 2002. Most of them were members of the State Guard
(2nd and 3rd Battalions). Related costs were in excess of $1.4 million
in 2001 and 2002. The justification for such a mobilization of this force
at that time is unclear since that mobilization was contrary to the guidance
set forth in National Guard Regulation (NGR) 10-4 (federal) in that the
resources of the National Guard should be unavailable prior to the activation
of state defense forces such as the New Jersey State Guard. This issue
speaks to the heart of the NJNMJC’s ability to respond. Upon the
assumption of my duties as Adjutant General in January 2002, I terminated
the state active duty for members of the NJNMJC and stood down accessions.
DMAVA undertook an internal review of the basis
for the establishment and utilization of the NJNMJC by convening a Committee
of military members
to assist me in my decision. In an effort to be all-inclusive, the Committee
consisted primarily of members of the NJNMJC, but also included members
of the New Jersey Army and Air National Guard, and DMAVA’s homeland
security directorate. The internal Committee proposed the mission of the
NJNMJC as: “Provide trained and ready components of the State defense
forces to respond to the call of the Governor in the event of a natural
disaster, manmade disaster, terrorist event, domestic disorder, and request
for assistance from civil authorities, public service support or other
missions as directed by the Governor or The Adjutant General.” The
operations identified are primarily waterborne security and support to
homeland security missions.
Because of the significant changes made in the
New Jersey’s approach
to homeland security operations since September 11, 2001, this initial
study was submitted to the Governor’s office for further inter-departmental
discussion. In accordance with the oversight of homeland security issues
required by the Domestic Security Preparedness Act of 2001 (P.L. 2001 c.
246), the Governor’s office subsequently requested a review by the
Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force (DSPTF). At two separate meetings,
the Task Force discussed the internal Committee’s proposed mission
for the NJNMJC. The DSPTF then delegated the final review to an Executive
Committee consisting of a Governor’s office representative, the Attorney
General, DMAVA, and the NJSP. Because the New Jersey National Guard primarily
supports the State through the management of emergency operations by the
NJSP, the State Police provided a review of the organization, structure,
mission, resources and command and control of the NJNMJC.
Current Homeland Security Operations
Under the auspices of the Domestic Security Preparedness
Act, oversight to the State’s homeland security operations is provided by the Domestic
Security Preparedness Task Force. Several departments participate and are
involved in direct counterterrorism activities as well as protection of
critical infrastructure—the Attorney General’s Office, the
NJSP, the Office of Counterterrorism, DMAVA, the Department of Transportation,
Department of Environmental Protection, Department of Health and Senior
Services, and the Department of Agriculture, to name a few. The State Office
of Emergency Management, which is administratively located within the Division
of State Police, coordinates the state’s response to declared emergencies,
coordinates state and local resources and supports local authorities under
the Incident Command System (“ICS”).
In an effort to more fully manage homeland security operations on a 24/7
basis, the NJSP created a Homeland Security Directorate, increased their
overall force composition, and enhanced several units including the NJSP
Marine Services Bureau. The NJSP Marine Services Bureau currently has an
MOA with the U.S. Coast Guard that provides the NJSP Marine Services Bureau
with enhanced law enforcement authority and impacts on several of the potential
operations identified by the NJNMJC.
In December 2002, the New Jersey National Guard opened a new Homeland
Security Center of Excellence with a state-of-the-art Joint Operations
Center (JOC). Response forces are task organized and managed by senior
officers. A command cell structure oversees all planning and current operations.
The stationing of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team-Heavy
(WMD-CST) was awarded to New Jersey in March 2004.
There are many other statewide Homeland Security efforts underway, including:
• Target-hardening activities such as those
undertaken by the Critical Infrastructure Advisory Committee and the
best practices identified by
sector.
• Specific mass transportation security initiatives
• Special interest items such as school and mall security.
•
Participation in a comprehensive exercise program with the Department of
Homeland Security such as TOPOFF—a national exercise.
• Technology assessment.
• Focus on urban initiatives.
•
NJSP’s initiative with the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)
Program which trains state and local volunteers to assist their communities
during an emergency.
Force Multiplier Issues
The New Jersey National Guard is experiencing federal
mobilizations at an historic pace to support overseas operations on the
Global War on Terrorism.
Even at today’s opstempo, the New Jersey National Guard (both Army
and Air) is fully capable of maintaining a 24/7 Joint Operations Center
(and have since July 2004), and fielding a National Guard Reaction Force
in accordance with directives from the National Guard Bureau. (A National
Guard Reaction Force must be capable of assembling a company-sized element
within four hours and employ a battalion-sized follow-on element within
24 hours to perform critical infrastructure protection missions). New Jersey
has been organized into two geographic task forces in order to comply.
An additional resource not available until 2004 is the stationing of a
WMD-CST Heavy in New Jersey. This highly trained, specialized team consists
of 22 fulltime Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members of the New Jersey Army
and Air National Guard capable of responding 24/7 to any WMD event. The
resources of this team have already been utilized extensively since 2002
in disaster preparations undertaken in response to specific threat intelligence
as augmentees to out-of-state CSTs who were fully certified. It is anticipated
that the New Jersey team will be fully validated this year.
Need Issues
Much has changed in port, waterway and overall homeland security since
2001 and 2002, which has greatly expanded the role for the NJSP Marine
Services Bureau. The utilization of emerging technologies in tracking and
sensor arrays assists both the U.S. Coast Guard and the New Jersey State
Police Marine Services Bureau in ways not envisioned in 2001 and certainly
not in 1999 when the NJNMJC was first re-organized and re-activated. The
New Jersey State Police manage a statewide Community Emergency Response
Team (CERT) Program that has produced over 4,300 volunteers in 160 teams
all certified to augment the first responder community with an additional
1,100 in the training pipeline. Once trained and certified, these volunteers
revert to supporting their local communities thus incurring virtually no
overhead or centralized administration costs. In 2004, almost 100 New Jersey
CERT volunteers were mobilized and sent to Florida to assist in hurricane
recovery operations. Their costs were reimbursed by the federal government.
At its peak, the NJNMJC had less than 400 members and currently there are
160 members actively drilling.
Command and Control Issues
NJSP identifies a conflict in that the bulk of the mission and operations
identified by the NJNMJC are waterborne and already are provided by the
State Police. Furthermore, in December 2004, the U.S. Coast Guard signed
an agreement with the NJSP Marine Services Bureau delegating federal law
enforcement powers on selected, critical portions
of our waterways to NJSP. By virtue of the fact that the NJNMJC was organized
as a force multiplier for the New Jersey National Guard, the command and
control of the NJNMJC would be in question. NJSP concluded that this dual
and potentially distractive command and control posture may lend itself
to conflicts and a diminished ability for the State Police to perform its
mission. In fact, the NJNMJC may distract from the performance of this
mission.
Organizational Issues
The DMAVA report identifies that for the NJNMJC to be viable and obtain
some federal recognition for potential access to federal resources, the
organization needs to dramatically change. If continued, the two entities
of New Jersey Naval Militia and the New Jersey State Guard must operate
separately.
The New Jersey National Guard is a unique organization with its mix of
federal and state response missions and capabilities. When called upon
by the Governor to assist, the New Jersey National Guard can be mobilized
to support operations in conjunction with the New Jersey State Police.
However, the infrastructure of the National Guard in all states is borne
by the federal government. They support the accession, equipping and training
of all military members. Any military organization requires significant
infrastructure such as a standing headquarters component. In the case of
the NJNMJC, all costs would fall to the State of New Jersey.
Reference is made to the New York model. New York
has two separate and distinct entities in their organizations—the
New York Naval Militia is completely separate from the New York State
Guard both in headquarters
management and in membership. This means that the preponderance of their
members (95% of the 4,000 by regulation) of the New York Naval Militia
are already actively drilling federally recognized Navy, Marine Corps and
Coast Guard Reservists. By contrast, approximately 40 members (1st Battalion)
of the NJNMJC are actively drilling Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard
reservists. And although New Jersey has the same 95% requirement, it was
only ever applied to the 1st Division because of the merged structure between
the New Jersey Naval Militia and the New Jersey State Guard. It is important
to note that the New York State
Police do not have any waterborne service units, thus the New York Naval
Militia does fulfill that mission for areas other than New York City where
active marine coverage is provided by the city police and fire waterborne
units. Finally, the New York Naval Militia has been in existence without
interruption for over 100 years, is an integral part of the New York Department
of Military and Naval Operations with an annual budget of over $300,000
and costs allocated to boats of $1-1.5 million.
Funding Issues
The issue of funding cannot be underestimated.
DMAVA’s internal
Committee review projected costs at $706,800 for Years 1-3. These costs
are for initial start-up only and do not include any mobilization costs
as incurred in 2001-2002 ($1.4 million). Given today’s fiscal environment,
if resources are directed to the NJNMJC, an assumption can be made that
the diversion of these resources will directly impact the New Jersey State
Police budget. Limited state resources available for waterborne security
would then be diluted by having two separate entities performing the same
mission and competing for similar funding.
Unresolved Issues
There have been a number of issues regarding the utilization and management
of the NJNMJC that have surfaced since 2002. There are significant concerns
regarding the lack of security clearances and background checks among the
members, the lack of fitness requirements, the lack of training guidance,
the lack of accession criteria, integrity in the rank assignments, and
overall liability issues. Bottom line, no regulations governing the NJNMJC
were ever adopted by the previous Adjutant General prior to their mobilization.
Draft regulations were finalized in 2003 but have not been adopted by DMAVA
pending this review. A legal review indicates that a statutory change is
needed in order for the NJNMJC to participate in what the internal Committee
proposed as part of the NJNMJC mission in homeland security, aid to localities
(N.J.S.A. 38A:3-6.1 Appendix C). In summary, these policy issues would
need to be resolved with appropriate legislation and regulations.
Conclusion
The utilization of the New Jersey Naval Militia and the New Jersey State
Guard are clearly outlined in New Jersey Statute (N.J.S.A. 38A:1-1, and
38A:1-3) to assist the New Jersey National Guard in the State mission.
However there have been a significant number of changes in how New Jersey
manages homeland security issues since 2001.
1. The Domestic Security
Preparedness Act outlines responsibilities of the Domestic Security Preparedness
Task Force to include oversight of homeland security, critical infrastructure,
WMD management, etc.
2. The New Jersey State Police have re-organized and enhanced their infrastructure
both in personnel and equipment with a focus on homeland security and
counter-terrorism activities. Their waterborne mission as provided by
the New Jersey State
Police Marine Services Bureau has broadened and they now have federal
law enforcement powers in an MOA with the U.S. Coast Guard. This is in
significant
contrast to the NJNMJC MOA with the Coast Guard that only allows for
support and permission for reservists to drill with the NJNMJC.
3. In accordance with NGR 10-4, the NJNMJC is a resource of last resort—only
after New Jersey National Guard resources are unable to fulfill their
mission. The New Jersey National Guard is still fully capable of meeting
State mission
requirements.
4. To be effective, significant changes would need to be made to the
organization of the NJNMJC. Statutory and regulatory changes and a structural
re-organization
would need to be made. Members need to comply with fitness requirements
and background checks would need to be initiated. Not addressed in any
attached review is the administrative burden this would place on DMAVA.
Changes aside, there are still concerns from the New Jersey State Police
regarding the command and control of the organization during operations.
5. Funding would need to be provided and competing interests would be
the New Jersey State Police and potentially the first responder community
as
well.
6. The CERT Program and other infrastructure developed since September
11, 2001 provide significant volunteer resources to the management of
emergency operations. This was done efficiently and cost effectively
without the
overhead costs that a military organization would incur such as in a
headquarters staffing.
Notwithstanding the internal DMAVA Committee report,
but taking into account New Jersey’s well defined and comprehensive plan to respond to homeland
security emergencies, and the New Jersey National Guard’s capability
to support the State mission, I could not conclude a clearly defined mission
for the NJNMJC as required by P.L. 2004 c. 300.
Sincerely,
GLENN K. RIETH
Major General
New Jersey National Guard
The Adjutant General
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