A-11

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

DECISION OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

In the Matter of Paul Williams,
Township of Lakewood

CSC Docket No. 2014-1750
OAL Docket No. CSV 01037-14

ISSUED: MAR 05 2015 (CSM)

The appeal of Paul Williams, Truck Driver, Heavy, Township of Lakewood, Department of Public Works, of his removal effective January 7, 2014, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Joseph A. Ascione (ALJ), who rendered his initial decision on December 10, 2014. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority.

Having considered the record and the ALJ's initial decision, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting on February 4, 2015, did not adopt the ALJ's recommendation to reverse the removal. Rather, the Commission imposed a six-month suspension and ordered that the appellant undergo a psychological fitness-for-duty examination prior to returning to work.

DISCUSSION

The appointing authority removed the appellant on charges of incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties, inability to perform duties, conduct unbecoming a public employee and other sufficient cause. Specifically, the appointing authority asserted that the appellant failed to report to a fitness for duty examination. Upon the appellant's appeal, the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) for a hearing as a contested case.

In his initial decision, the ALJ found that on or about March 28, 2013, Mike Muscillo, Township Manager, received an anonymous letter from a "very concerned employee" of the Lakewood Public Works Department making allegations about the

appellant's conduct in the workplace. Eight months later, on December 2, 2013, the appellant had a meeting with his supervisors, who advised him that he would be sent for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination and that if he did not attend the examination he would face disciplinary action. Thereafter, Alvin Burdge, Director, Department of Public Works, notified the appellant by letter of an initial appointment scheduled with Dr. Raymond F. Hanbury, Jr., Ph.D, for December 16, 2013 and a follow-up appointment scheduled for December 20, 2013. The letter indicated that transportation would be provided and that failure to attend either appointment would be grounds for disciplinary action. However, the appellant did not attend either evaluation with Dr. Hanbury. Burdge testified that the appellant exhibited extremes of demeanor, at times being confrontational, and at other times walking away from someone who wished to speak with him. Although he became aware of the anonymous letter sent to Muscillo in April 2013, Burdge never investigated the letter or its contents and did not know the name of the individual who wrote the letter. Additionally, Burdge testified that while the appellant has been a problem, he performed his work satisfactorily.

Based on the foregoing, the ALJ determined that the nature of the appellant's work as a Truck Driver, Heavy did not constitute a compelling reason to subject him to a psychological examination, particularly since the appointing authority offered no evidence that any investigation of the anonymous letter had been taken or that specific facts uncovered through such an investigation would constitute a reasonable basis on which to request a psychological examination. Therefore, since there was no reasonable basis for the appellant to attend the examination, the ALJ concluded that the appointing authority failed to meet its burden of proof and recommended reversing the removal.

In its exceptions to the ALJ's decision, the appointing authority concedes that it did not conduct an investigation and argues that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to investigate an anonymous letter. Nevertheless, as the letter was anonymous, it is clear that the author was in fear of the appellant as well as fearful for fellow employees' safety, making it doubtful that an investigation would have revealed the author of the letter. Regardless, Burdge testified that the appellant had been a problem in the past, exhibited extremes in behavior and had been disciplined in the past for refusing to assist another employee on a job related task. Therefore, the appointing authority maintains that it would have been derelict in its duty to protect its employees and potentially been liable had the appellant actually harmed a fellow employee. In this regard, it states that the fact that the appellant refused to attend the examination is evidence of a problem and when faced with a choice of not sending or sending him for an examination, it opted to send him for the examination.

Upon on its *de novo* review of the record, the Commission does not agree with the ALJ's assessment of the charges. Initially, there is no dispute as to what

occurred. The appellant was ordered by his superiors to report for a fitness-for-duty evaluation and he did not comply with that order. The ALJ specifically found that the appointing authority's evidence only addressed the appellant's failure to appear for the examinations. Thus, the appellant was insubordinate for failing to perform his duty by disregarding his superiors' orders to appear for the fitness-for-duty examinations. The ALJ interpreted the charges of incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and other sufficient cause narrowly, finding that the appellant's conduct could not be considered under those charges.

Regardless, it is clear that those charges could have been amended to include insubordination. This amendment would not have prejudiced the appellant, since the specification underlying the charges in the Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) and the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) clearly subsumed allegations of insubordination. Specifically, the specifications on the PNDA and FNDA clearly indicated that the appellant was told both orally and in writing by his supervisors to attend fitness-for-duty examinations and he refused to attend them. Thus, the appellant was on notice of the accusations against him via the sustained specifications. *See N.J.A.C.* 1:1-6.2(a)("Unless precluded by law or constitutional principle, pleading may be freely amended when, in the judge's discretion, an amendment would be in the interest of efficiency, expediency, and the avoidance of over-technical pleading requirements and would not create undue prejudice"); *See also, Hammond v. Monmouth County Sheriff's Department*, 317 *N.J. Super.* 199 (App. Div. 1999); *Lamont Walker v. Burlington County*, Docket No. A-3485-00T3 (App. Div. October 9, 2002); *In the Matter of Charles Motley* (MSB, decided February 25, 2004). Accordingly, the Commission finds that the appellant is guilty of the charge of insubordination for his actions in this matter.

In determining the proper penalty, the Commission's review is *de novo*. In addition to its consideration of the seriousness of the underlying incident in determining the proper penalty, the Commission also utilizes, when appropriate, the concept of progressive discipline. *West New York v. Bock*, 38 *N.J.* 500 (1962). In determining the propriety of the penalty, several factors must be considered, including the nature of the appellant's offense, the concept of progressive discipline, and the employee's prior record. *George v. North Princeton Developmental Center*, 96 *N.J.A.R. 2d* (CSV) 463. However, it is well established that where the underlying conduct is of an egregious nature, the imposition of a penalty up to and including removal is appropriate, regardless of an individual's disciplinary history. *See Henry v. Rahway State Prison*, 81 *N.J.* 571 (1980). It is settled that the theory of progressive discipline is not a "fixed and immutable rule to be followed without question." Rather, it is recognized that some disciplinary infractions are so serious that removal is appropriate notwithstanding a largely unblemished prior record. *See Carter v. Bordentown,* 191 *N.J.* 474 (2007). In this case, the appellant's blatant disregard of oral and written orders from his superiors is significantly egregious to

warrant a substantial penalty. Failure to comply with the orders of a superior is precisely the type of conduct that adversely affects morale or efficiency and has a tendency to destroy public respect for governmental employees and confidence in the operation of public services. Accordingly, the Commission finds that a six-month suspension is an appropriate penalty in this matter and is neither unduly harsh nor disproportionate to the offense.

Regarding the appellant's fitness for duty, the Commission finds the appointing authority's exceptions persuasive that it had a duty to follow up on the letter and corroborating reports from supervisors with a psychological examination. Thus, while his insubordinate behavior of refusing to attend the scheduled examinations is an insufficient basis to support the appellant's removal, the Commission has trepidation ordering the appellant's reinstatement without some assurance that he is fully capable of performing the duties of his position. Thus, the appellant should be scheduled for an evaluation with a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist. The selection of the psychiatrist or psychologist shall be by agreement of both parties within 30 days of the date of this decision. The appointing authority shall pay for the cost of this evaluation. If the psychiatrist or psychologist determines that the appellant is fit for duty, without qualification, the appellant is to be immediately reinstated to his position. If the psychologist or psychiatrist determines that the appellant is unfit for duty, then the appointing authority should charge the appellant with inability to perform duties based on his current unfitness, with a current date of removal. Upon receipt of that FNDA, the appellant may appeal that matter to the Commission in accordance with *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2-2.8. Upon timely submission of any such appeal, the appellant would be entitled to a hearing regarding the current finding of unfitness only. In either case, he would be entitled to mitigated back pay, benefits, and seniority from the end of his six-month suspension until the time he is either reinstated or removed. If he passes the examination, under no circumstances should his reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any back pay dispute. Additionally, in light of the Appellate Division's decision in *Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections,* Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. February 26, 2003), the Commission's decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay are finally resolved.

With respect to counsel fees, *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2-2.12 provides for the award of counsel fees only where an employee has prevailed on all or substantially all of the primary issues in an appeal. The primary issue in any disciplinary appeal is the merits of the charges, not whether the penalty imposed was appropriate. *See Johnny Walcott v. City of Plainfield,* 282 *N.J. Super.* 121, 128 (App. Div. 1995); *James L. Smith v. Department of Personnel,* Docket No. A4489-02T2 (App. Div. March 18, 2004); *In the Matter of Robert Dean* (MSB, decided January 12, 1993); *In the Matter of Ralph Cozzino* (MSB, decided September 21, 1989). In this case, the Commission sustained the charge of insubordination for the appellant's underlying

conduct and imposed a six-month suspension. Therefore, he is not entitled to counsel fees.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the removal of the appellant was not justified and instead, imposes a six-month suspension. The Commission also orders, prior to reinstatement, the appellant undergo a psychological fitness-for-duty examination. The outcome of that examination shall determine whether the appellant is entitled to be reinstated or removed, as outlined previously. In either case, the appellant is entitled to back pay, benefits and seniority for the period following his six month suspension until he is either reinstated or removed. The amount of back pay awarded is to be reduced and mitigated as provided for in *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2-2.10. The appellant shall provide proof of income earned to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision. Pursuant to *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2-2.10, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay. However, under no circumstances should the appellant's reinstatement be delayed pending resolution of any back pay dispute.

Counsel fees are denied pursuant to *N.J.A.C.* 4A:2-2.12.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay within 60 days of the appellant's reinstatement or removal. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to *R.* 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter should be pursued in the Appellate Division.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON
THE 4th DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2015

Robert M. Czech
Chairperson
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries
and
Correspondence

Henry Maurer
Director
Division of Appeals
and Regulatory Affairs
Civil Service Commission
P.O. Box 312
Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312

Attachment

State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INITIAL DECISION
OAL DKT. NO. CSV 01037-14
AGENCY DKT. NO. 2014-1750

IN THE MATTER OF PAUL WILLIAMS,
TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS.

Kevin P. McGovern, Esq., for appellant Paul Williams (Mets, Schiro, McGovern, attorneys)

Steven Secare, Esq., for respondent Township of Lakewood, Department of Public Works (Secare & Hensel, attorneys)

Record Closed: September 30, 2014 Decided: December 10, 2014

BEFORE **JOSEPH A. ASCIONE**, ALJ:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant, Paul Williams, appeals his January 7, 2014, removal as a "truck driver, heavy," by the Township of Lakewood, Department of Public Works (DPW), for failing to report for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination. Appellant argues that there was no reasonable basis to request the psychological fitness-for-duty examination, and therefore the Township's removal action for failure to attend the examination must be dismissed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 16, 2013, a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action (PNDA) was issued against Williams charging him with violations of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a):[1] (1) incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; (3) inability to perform duties; (6) conduct unbecoming a public employee; and (12)[2] other sufficient cause. (J-3.) The incident giving rise to the charges was appellant's failure to attend a "mandatory fitness for duty examination." A departmental hearing was held on January 6, 2014, and on January 7, 2014, a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action (FNDA) was issued sustaining the charges and notifying appellant of his removal. (J-5.) Williams appealed, and the matter was transmitted by the Civil Service Commission to the Office of Administrative Law, where on January 27, 2014, it was filed for determination as a contested case, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15 and N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. A hearing was held on August 14, 2014. At that time, the parties requested the opportunity to submit written closing statements and legal memoranda. The record closed on September 30, 2014, upon the receipt of the post-hearing submissions.

FINDINGS OF FACT

I **FIND** the following undisputed **FACTS**, as stipulated by the parties (J-4):

1. Appellant Paul Williams was employed by respondent Township of Lakewood (hereinafter, "Township") as a "truck driver, heavy."

2. Appellant is a member of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 97 (hereinafter, "Union"), and is covered under the terms of a Collective Negotiations Agreement entered into between the Union and the Township.

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[1] The notices of disciplinary action cited incorrect regulations in the "Charges" section. Pursuant to the parties' Stipulation of Facts, the regulation that the Township alleges has been violated by appellant is N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a).

[2] Amended by R.2012 d.056, effective March 5, 2012; recodified former (a)(11) as (a)(12).

3. On or around March 28, 2013, Mike Muscillo, Township manager, received an anonymous letter (from a "Very concerned employee at Lakewood Public Works"). A date stamp on the letter indicates that it was received in the Township's Office of the Municipal Manager on April 4, 2013. This letter made allegations about appellant's conduct in the workplace. (J-1.)

4. On December 2, 2013, appellant had a meeting with his supervisors. At that meeting, the Township advised appellant that he would be sent for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination, and that if he did not attend such an examination he would face disciplinary action.

5. On or around December 10, 2013, Alvin Burdge, the DPW director, notified appellant by letter of an initial meeting with Dr. Raymond F. Hanbury, Jr., Ph.D., on Monday, December 16, 2013, at 2:00 p.m. The letter stated that a follow-up meeting was scheduled for Friday, December 20, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. at Dr. Hanbury's office. The letter stated that transportation to the appointments would be provided, and that failure to attend either appointment would be grounds for further disciplinary action. (J-2.)

6. Appellant did not attend either of the evaluations with Dr. Hanbury arranged by the Township.

7. On December 18, 2013, appellant was served with a Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action, suspending him immediately, for allegedly violating the following sections of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a): incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; inability to perform duties; conduct unbecoming a public employee; and other sufficient cause. (J-3.)

8. On December 18, 2013, appellant requested a hearing concerning his suspension. (J-4.)

9. Appellant's hearing concerning his suspension was held on January 6, 2014.

10. On January 7, 2014, appellant received a Final Notice of Disciplinary Action terminating his employment. (J-5.)

11. On January 10, 2014, through his Union, appellant filed a timely appeal of his termination. (J-6.)

TESTIMONY

Alvin Burdge

Burdge testified that he has been employed with the Lakewood DPW for thirty-two years, the last four as acting director. He testified that appellant Williams has been a problem in the past. Williams exhibited extremes of demeanor, at times being confrontational, and at other times walking away from someone who wished to speak with him. In the past year, Williams received a discipline for refusal to assist another employee. In April 2013, Burdge became aware of the contents of the anonymous letter received by the Township manager, Michael Muscillo. He did not investigate the letter or its contents. Burdge never knew the name of the individual who wrote the letter. Burdge could not testify what investigation, if any, Muscillo made into the allegations contained in the letter.

In 2010, Williams, subsequent to a serious work-related injury, had been asked to appear for a fitness-for-duty examination, which he did. The 2010 request to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination was related to medication he was taking at the time, not related to the present issue. The 2013 request to undergo a psychological fitness-for-duty examination was not related to job performance. Burdge testified that while Williams has been a problem, he did perform his work satisfactorily.

Patrick Guaschino

Guaschino testified to his position as business manager of Teamsters Local 97 and his familiarity with Williams from prior dealings with Williams's employer. He became aware of the request made to Williams to attend a fitness-for-duty psychological examination. He attended a hearing with Muscillo and presented case law in support of appellant's argument that the request to attend was unfounded. He saw the anonymous letter while meeting with Muscillo on another matter. Guaschino testified that Muscillo stated at that meeting that he had to act on the letter. Guaschino questioned Muscillo about the legal basis for taking such action. Muscillo advised Guaschino that he would contact counsel. Guaschino did not know that Muscillo had taken action on the anonymous letter until the disciplinary proceedings. Guaschino recognized that the anonymous letter could create a justifiable concern, but he had no knowledge of whether the letter was investigated by Muscillo. Guaschino said that he would have done further investigation to learn the identity of the writer and discover whether there was any truth to the allegations in the letter.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on both witnesses' credible testimony and the documentary evidence, I **FIND** the following additional **FACTS**:

12. There is no documentary or testimonial evidence of an investigation by the Township of the anonymous letter to determine the veracity of the allegations contained therein.

13. The request that Williams attend a psychological fitness-for-duty examination was not related to his work performance or to any specific allegation of psychologically disruptive behavior.

14. Williams's work performance was satisfactory.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

Civil service employees' rights and duties are governed by the Civil Service Act and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 11A:12-6; N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1.1. The Act is an important inducement to attract qualified people to public service and is to be liberally applied toward merit appointment and tenure protection. Mastrobattista v. Essex Cnty. Park Comm'n, 46 N.J. 138, 147 (1965). However, consistent with public policy and civil service law, a public entity should not be burdened with an employee who fails to perform his or her duties satisfactorily or who engages in misconduct related to his or her duties. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(a). Such an employee may be subject to major discipline. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(b), 11A:2-6, 11A:2-20; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2, -2.3(a).

An appeal to the Civil Service Commission requires the OAL to conduct a de novo hearing to determine the employee's guilt or innocence, as well as the appropriate penalty if the charges are sustained. In re Morrison, 216 N.J. Super. 143 (App. Div. 1987).

The burden of persuasion falls on the appointing authority in enforcement proceedings to prove a violation of administrative regulations. Cumberland Farms v. Moffett, 218 N.J. Super. 331, 341 (App. Div. 1987). The appointing authority must prove its case by a preponderance of the credible evidence, which is the standard in administrative proceedings. Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962). Precisely what is needed to satisfy the standard must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The evidence must be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to the given conclusion. Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263 (1958). Preponderance may also be described as the greater weight of credible evidence in the case, not necessarily dependent on the number of witnesses, but having the greater convincing power. State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47 (1975).

In this case, the issue is whether the Township's action of removing Williams from his position for his failure to attend a psychological fitness-for-duty examination

was reasonably justified. In order for the action to be reasonably justified, this tribunal must find that the Township had sufficient factual information upon which to base a request for a psychological examination.

A request that an employee attend a psychological fitness-for-duty examination cannot be made lightly. The request for the examination must be reasonably related to the individual's job duties or the individual's psychologically disruptive behavior in the work environment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(d)(4)(A) provides that "[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity." Williams worked in the position of truck driver, heavy. The nature of his work, as compared with, for example, that of a law enforcement officer, did not constitute a compelling reason to subject him to a psychological examination. The work that Williams regularly performed did not involve the safety of other Township personnel or the public. The anonymous letter may have legitimately raised concerns for the Township; however, respondent offered insufficient evidence that any investigation of the anonymous letter had been undertaken by the Township. Burdge testified that Muscillo's responsibility included investigation of the anonymous letter, but the Township offered no evidence of specific facts uncovered through such an investigation that would constitute a reasonable basis upon which to request a psychological examination. The Township's evidence addressed only Williams's failure to appear for the examinations.

In support of its actions, the Township cited Hamilton v. Monroe Municipal Utilities Authority, 94 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 656, and Perrin v. New Jersey Veterans Memorial Home, Vineland, 92 N.J.A.R.2d (CSV) 148. Hamilton involved failure by an employee to have his pager turned on over a weekend when on emergency call. The employee had a history of alcoholism and excessive absenteeism. The employer offered direct testimony of the danger to the public of the employee's inability to respond to an emergency. Perrin involved an actual assault by an employee on a coworker (an unwanted sexual advance) on more than one occasion. In both cases,

the employer's removal of the employee was upheld. The facts of these two cases are very different from the facts of the instant case. Here, there was no evidence of a risk of injury to a fellow employee or the public, and no evidence or allegation of physical contact with another employee. The evidence offered by the respondent is an anonymous letter that the Township took eight months to act on. There is no showing of an investigation into the anonymous letter. Burdge credibly testified that appellant may be confrontational at times; however, this observation regarding appellant was not the asserted basis for the Township's request for a psychological fitness-for-duty examination of Williams.

Williams did fail to attend the psychological fitness-for-duty examination, but without a reasonable basis for the request that he undergo the examination, the Township cannot punish him for failure to attend. Such an examination was not job-related and consistent with business necessity. Williams has been charged with violations of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a): (1) incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; (3) inability to perform duties; (6) conduct unbecoming a public employee; and (12) other sufficient cause. None of these charges can be sustained with the limited evidence presented by the Township. I **CONCLUDE** that the Township has failed to meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Williams committed the charged violations.

ORDER

For the reasons stated above, I hereby **ORDER** that the removal of Williams by the Township is **REVERSED**, and I **ORDER** that the Township immediately reinstate Williams to the position of truck driver, heavy.

I further **ORDER** that Williams be awarded back pay, benefits and seniority from January 7, 2014, to the date of reinstatement pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10. I further **ORDER** that Williams be awarded reasonable counsel fees pursuant to N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12.

I hereby **FILE** my Initial Decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, P.O. Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

December 10, 2014
DATE



JOSEPH A. ASCIONE, ALJ

Date Received at Agency: 12/10/14

Date Mailed to Parties: 12/10/14

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APPENDIX

LIST OF WITNESSES

For Appellant:

Patrick Guaschino, Business Representative, Teamsters Local 97

For Respondent:

Alvin Burdge, Acting Director of Public Works, Township of Lakewood

LIST OF EXHIBITS

Joint:

J-1 Anonymous letter, April 4, 2013
J-2 Burdge letter, December 10, 2013
J-3 Preliminary Notice of Disciplinary Action
J-4 Request for hearing, December 18, 2013
J-5 Final Notice of Disciplinary Action
J-6 Appeal of removal, January 10, 2014
J-7 Stipulation of Facts