Report of the
Transportation and Infrastructure
Transition Advisory Committee

Submitted to Governor-elect Phil Murphy and Lieutenant Governor-elect Sheila Oliver

January 1, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Transportation and Infrastructure Transition Advisory Committee recommends that the Governor-elect consider the following recommendations to accomplish the top five key priorities:

I. **Priority: Prioritize as a key administration objective the completion of the Gateway Tunnel and new Port Authority Bus Terminal projects**
   i. Task a senior level individual within the Governor’s Office to oversee the status of these projects on a day-to-day basis to signify the significance of these projects and allow for swift and aggressive action as situations arise

II. **Priority: Assess financial condition of state transportation agencies, assess their capital and operating needs and resources and produce both a capital needs blueprint and an Action Plan for increasing operating funds to sufficient levels at NJ Transit and NJDOT**
   i. The Commissioner, in concert with the Treasurer, should be directed to provide, within 100 days:
      • An assessment of each agency’s (NJDOT, NJ Transit, NJ Turnpike and the Port Authority of NY & NJ) financial (capital and operating) condition
      • Such an assessment should further determine the sufficiency of capital resources (Transportation Trust Fund, federal and other) expected to be available to meet state-of-good repair and high priority capital project needs; proposals for meeting any insufficiency and producing a cohesive, updated capital needs and resources blueprint, including a financing plan for construction of the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail onto the Northern Branch corridor and a plan for utilization of unused federal highway safety funds
      • Such an assessment should further produce an Action Plan on the operating needs and resources of NJ Transit and NJDOT from the General Fund or otherwise; identification of instability and insufficiency of resources for operations purposes for both NJ Transit and NJDOT, proposals for stabilizing and increasing to sufficient levels the operational resources of both NJ Transit and NJDOT, on a sustained basis

III. **Priority: Improve service delivery and the enhancement of service to the public at reduced costs**
   i. Direct NJ Transit’s Executive Director to conduct an evaluation and prepare an Action Plan, within 100 days, concerning the qualifications and performance at the executive and upper management levels and an inventory of vacant positions that have contributed to declines of service to the public
   ii. Legislation should be pursued that would: 1) provide flexibility for alternate delivery methods by all transportation agencies to be used; 2) strengthen and expand qualifications based selection for professional services procurement; and 3) provide for the use of innovative revenue options by our transportation agencies
   iii. Provide new leadership for promotion of road and rail safety and efficiency

IV. **Priority: Appoint an emergency manager at New Jersey Transit tasked with bolstering the relationship with Amtrak**
   i. Appoint an emergency manager to oversee the global relationship with Amtrak and to ensure the state’s interests are properly addressed

V. **Priority: Emphasize transparency to improve customer experience and to demonstrate value of system investments**
i. Direct all agency websites and apps be rebuilt to emphasize transparency through the creation of a project dashboard, streaming and archiving live proceedings, and providing real time information of public interest

ii. Implement an electronic data records transfer system to expedite access to crash data across agencies and empower project planners and law enforcement agencies to effectively identify high risk areas and allocate resources effectively

iii. Revitalize use of the Access Management Code permitting process
REPORT

I. PRIORITY: PRIORITYIZE AS A KEY ADMINISTRATION OBJECTIVE THE COMPLETION OF THE GATEWAY TUNNEL AND NEW PORT AUTHORITY BUS TERMINAL PROJECTS.

i. Recommendation: Task a senior level individual within the Governor’s Office to oversee the status of these projects on a day-to-day basis to signify the significance of these projects and allow for swift and aggressive action as situations arise

There is a great need for a senior level person in the Governor’s office to be in charge of monitoring developments for the Governor and acting on his behalf regarding the Gateway project. This need has been intensified by the apparent disavowal by the Trump administration of the project’s three-way funding plan established under the Obama administration with the state of New Jersey and New York, as evidenced in an official letter from the Federal Transit Administration to Governors Andrew Cuomo and Chris Christie in late December. This response comes despite widespread understanding that a closure of the rail tunnels due to Superstorm Sandy damage, in conjunction with the inability to increase bus service into New York City through the Port Authority Bus Terminal, would be an economic catastrophe that would severely harm the regional economy and the entire Northeast.

These projects – Gateway and expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal – will serve as the most significant economic stimulus projects for New Jersey over the next 10 years. The benefits of a new tunnel and an expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal are well known, including shorter commute times, increased reliability, less roadway congestion, greenhouse gas emissions reductions, increasing the desirability of transit oriented development, increasing municipal and state tax revenues, and job creation from both the project itself and expansion of the economy.

The Gateway Project

The Obama administration recognized the importance and the repercussions of allowing trans-Hudson rail crossings to be placed in jeopardy. As a result, the Gateway project became the highest priority rail transit project nationally under President Obama’s administration. The federal government committed to funding 50% of the project’s costs. Now, the federal share and the use of federal loan funds by the states to satisfy their local share will have to be renegotiated.

This financing setback occurs at a most uncomfortable moment, while the region is in a race against time. The current 107-year-old tunnels suffered severe flooding damage from Superstorm Sandy. Unless engineers are able to begin major rehabilitation work on the current tubes, one or both could fail within the next decade. The closing of just one of those tunnels would cause a reduction in capacity of approximately 75%, with the number of peak hour trains reduced from 24 to six entering New York City.

While Phase 1 of Gateway moves through the environmental process, it is imperative that the entire project, including Phases 1 and 2, presses onward. Phase 1, the completion of the new tunnels followed by the rehabilitation of the existing tubes (a process that will last until at least 2030), will not significantly expand capacity for New Jersey commuters. It will result in going from two tubes to four, but does not result in expansion of platform space or more tracks at Penn Station New York. The completion of Phase 2 of the project, which would include the construction of additional tracks and platforms in New York City will allow for
more trains to operate across the Hudson at the same time. That is why in the long-term, this
designated official’s responsibility will be to ensure a continued focus on Gateway Phase 2.

Expansion of the Port Authority Bus Terminal

The Port Authority of NY & NJ Board of Commissioners has launched a draft Environmental
Impact Study to guide how it can expand capacity for interstate bus traffic. Handling 230,000
riders each weekday, the Bus Terminal is the busiest of all the trans-Hudson public transit
facilities. Interstate buses serve many areas of New Jersey and Rockland and Orange (NY)
counties that are outside the influence of a commuter rail line.

The Bus Terminal is currently operating at full capacity during peak hours. Several years ago,
bus congestion became so severe inside and around the Bus Terminal during the evening
peak period that reliability was regularly compromised. After NJ Transit and Port Authority
staff put into effect a number of operational changes to restore order temporarily, Port
Authority staff instituted a bar on increasing evening peak hour departures. This bar
recognized that the growth in usage of the existing facility cannot occur without
commensurate investment in new capacity.

Two types of plans are being considered: the construction of a new terminal between Ninth
and Eleventh Avenue south of W.40th Street (further from the current convenient subway
connections) and a novel plan to expand bus operations to two new floors built on top of the
terminal’s current footprint. The planning process has been subjected to opposition from
neighbors of the terminal. The State of New York has been resistant to setting aside large
outlays for this project in the Port Authority’s long-range capital budget.

The senior level administration official tasked with this job would have the full authority to
engage with New York State, the Port Authority, New York City and, in the case of Gateway,
the federal government, Amtrak, and the Gateway Program Development Corporation.
Responsibilities would include making sure milestones are achieved, monitoring real-time
funding conditions, developing recommendations to restructure funding approaches, ensuring
New Jersey’s planning needs are being met, and being in a position to brief the governor
daily on any changing conditions. In light of challenging funding signals being sent by the
Trump administration, the restructuring of finding arrangements will, initially, be the most
critical for this senior level administration official. Engaging the congressional delegation for
its support, so New Jersey speaks with one voice, will be important as well.

The ultimate goal of this recommendation is to provide the Governor with the information
and tools to see these projects to completion. A major part of carrying out that objective will
be the direct engagement of the Governor both publicly and privately to demonstrate that the
completion of these projects is an administration priority.

In addition to the senior level official focusing on these projects daily and the governor’s
direct involvement, further steps will be required for this to be a success.

The State should consider an educational campaign for both Gateway and the Bus Terminal
projects, by engaging the public and stakeholders on both sides of the river laying out the dire
funding issues surrounding the projects, the economic importance to both states, and the
perilous safety condition of the current tunnel. A campaign can show the potential decline in
productivity of the businesses in New York, when their employees can no longer commute
there, or the reduced revenues that will be seen without the foot traffic of New Jerseyans
around New York City.
The hard costs for each project themselves are substantial. Gateway, phases 1 and 2, are estimated to cost upwards of $30 billion. Phase 1, the immediate focus, is estimated to cost $12.7 billion. In late 2016 Senators Booker and Schumer arranged a funding framework for the project by which the federal government would pay 50% of the total project and the states of New Jersey and New York would each contribute 25% each. In late 2017, proposals were announced by Governors Christie and Cuomo, detailing how their respective states would fund their portions of phase 1 under the Obama administration approved structure. Governor Christie offered that New Jersey would begin charging a fee on rail trips in and out of New York that would escalate over time to cover $1.9 billion in funding, while New York will use general fund allocations over a 35-year span to cover $1.75 billion in borrowed funding. These funds, in addition to the Port Authority contributing $1.9 billion, total $5.5 billion for the project, leaving the remaining amount to be funded by federal dollars. As noted above, the Trump administration has officially rejected this funding plan denying that any agreement exists.

The cost of the new Port Authority Bus Terminal has varied widely as building concepts have evolved. Further detail on cost estimates will be forthcoming from the Draft Environmental Impact Study. Currently, the Port Authority of New York and Jersey’s 10-year Capital Plan has committed $3.5 billion to the project, of which $0.5 million are proposed to be obtained from a federal grant.

II. PRIORITY: ASSESS FINANCIAL CONDITION OF STATE TRANSPORTATION AGENCIES, ASSESS THEIR CAPITAL AND OPERATING NEEDS AND RESOURCES AND PRODUCE BOTH A CAPITAL NEEDS BLUEPRINT AND AN ACTION PLAN FOR INCREASING OPERATING FUNDS TO SUFFICIENT LEVELS AT NJ TRANSIT AND NJDOT

i. Recommendation: The Department of Transportation Commissioner, in concert with the Treasurer, should be directed to provide, within 100 days:
   • An assessment of each agency’s (NJDOT, NJ Transit, NJ Turnpike and the Port Authority of NY & NJ) financial (capital and operating) condition;
   • Such an assessment should further determine the sufficiency of capital resources (Transportation Trust Fund, federal and other) expected to be available to meet state-of-good repair and high priority capital project needs; proposals for meeting any insufficiency and producing a cohesive, updated capital needs and resources blueprint, including a financing plan for construction of the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail onto the Northern Branch corridor and a plan for utilization of unused federal highway safety funds;
   • Such an assessment should further produce an Action Plan on the operating needs and resources of NJ Transit and NJDOT from the General Fund or otherwise; identification of instability and insufficiency of resources for operations purposes for both NJ Transit and NJDOT, proposals for stabilizing and increasing to sufficient levels the operational resources of both NJ Transit and NJDOT, on a sustained basis.

Two of the greatest transportation challenges confronting Governor-elect Murphy are meeting expectations for long-deferred capital projects with limited financial resources and finding a way to stabilize the funding of NJ Transit’s annual operating budget. Sorting out these issues early in the administration will provide the public with an honest assessment of what can be done and the administration’s new transportation leadership with a realistic pathway forward.

From 2010 forward, the state’s Transportation Trust Fund was functioning at a reduced level, resulting in many larger projects being held back from implementation. Legislation passed last
fall, increased the size of the State’s contribution to its annual transportation capital program from $1.3 billion to $2 billion per year. However, funding for all the state’s transportation needs cannot be met by this amount. Approximately seven cents of the 23-cent gas tax increase are dedicated to paying debt service accumulated since 2010 on bonds issued by the Trust Fund that were not backed by a revenue stream. The Trust Fund annual amount set aside for local aid projects has been doubled, further hampering funding for public transit. And projects that could grow our public transit system are vying for limited funds with state-of-good repair needs across the state’s highway and transit systems.

A priority “New Start” project for the next administration would be the extension of the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail Line onto the Northern Branch Corridor in Bergen County. Also in the queue are the Glassboro-to-Camden diesel light rail line; the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail West Side Line extension over Route 440 in Jersey City; the Mid-Line Loop to serve a new North Brunswick station on the Northeast Corridor; and two long-standing Raritan Valley Line projects, the Hunter interlocking overpass and a third track for the Aldene to Hunter segment. Under the best of circumstances, it is doubtful the Transportation Trust Fund, augmented by federal funds, can realize many of these promising projects without new revenue sources.

Over-arching this competition are two potential threats being posed by the Trump administration. The first is its apparent disavowal of the Gateway project funding principles and structure negotiated by the states of New Jersey and New York with the Obama administration. The outcome of this revision process could force New Jersey to use unknown amounts of Transportation Trust Fund dollars to plug urgent gaps in Gateway project financing. The second threat is the Trump administration’s stated intent to terminate the “New Starts” capital assistance program on which proponents of the Northern Branch light rail project were counting. At this point, it is unknown whether any “infrastructure” initiative advanced by the Trump administration will be enacted, and, if it is, whether it will benefit New Jersey’s capital agenda, directly or indirectly.

Operating budget

In recent years the operating budgets of NJ Transit and NJ DOT have been seriously squeezed. In the last decade, NJ Transit drew as much as $350 million from the State’s General Fund. In fiscal year 2016, that amount was reduced by more than 90%.

Sharp cutbacks have taken a toll on each agency’s staff. At NJ Transit, numerous highly qualified personnel have departed for other transit agencies which have been able to offer higher salaries. Maintenance of rolling stock has also suffered; NJ Transit’s average distance between rail rolling stock failures lags its peers. At NJ DOT, staff shortages have occurred and permanent positions have been left vacant due to salary compression. Employees have been denied professional development opportunities and even had their voicemail services removed.

In both cases, techniques have been used to transfer federal capital funds into operating purposes. An obvious case is the approximately $300 million dollars in federal transit rehabilitation funds that annually have been used for “preventive maintenance” purposes that are officially accounted for as “operating” expenses. Similarly, the federal highway capital program is raided for activities such as cleaning of drainage systems.

As NJ Transit has lost ground in the annual competition for access to the General Fund, its funding has become less stable. For a number of years it benefited from an annual transfer of $295 million from Turnpike Authority revenues. For the past two years that number has shrunk to $204 million per year, as the Turnpike Authority leadership deemed it could not afford the previous high contribution level. Similarly, amounts of $62 million and $82 million have been
diverted from the Clean Energy Fund to the NJ Transit operating budget. With respect to these two external revenue sources, NJ Transit managers cannot anticipate from year to year what their contribution might be to the NJ Transit operating budget.

The proposed assessment should result in an Action Plan which addresses budget shortfalls and innovative ways to finance transportation needs in the state.

III. PRIORITY: IMPROVE SERVICE DELIVERY AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC AT REDUCED COSTS

i. Recommendation: Direct NJ Transit’s Executive Director to conduct an evaluation and prepare an Action Plan, within 100 days, concerning the qualifications and performance at the executive and upper management levels and an inventory of vacant positions that have contributed to declines of service to the public

For many years since its founding in 1979, NJ Transit served as a model public transit agency, winning numerous awards by transit’s national trade association and serving as a training ground for transit executives throughout the nation. Its personnel and financial treatment at the hands of the Christie administration has led to canceled trains, equipment failures, safety citations, a fatal train accident, loss of dozens of experienced supervisory personnel, and locomotive engineers, and low employee morale.

A recent NorthJersey.com article documented a pattern of NJ Transit hiring of persons since 2014 at high salaries who did not appear qualified for their positions.

After the issuance of federal rail safety citations and the September 2016 crash at Hoboken Terminal, NJ Transit’s Executive Director acknowledged that numbers of authorized safety inspector positions were vacant. This year, trains were canceled as a dispute raged between NJ Transit management and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers about the adequacy of locomotive engineer rosters and of the engineer’s training program. Meanwhile, it has been reported that NJ Transit lost train engineers to MTA’s Metro North Railroad, because Metro North is able to pay higher wages.

The Governor-elect should order an intensive review of staff qualifications, performance, and salaries among those serving at NJ Transit’s executive and upper management levels. It will also examine staff vacancies and report on steps being taken to fill them.

ii. Recommendation: Endorse legislation to: 1) provide flexibility for alternate delivery methods by all transportation agencies to be used; 2) strengthen and expand qualifications based selection for professional services procurement; and 3) provide for the use of innovative revenue options by our transportation agencies

The transportation and infrastructure needs of the state are growing at a time when budget dollars are constrained. If New Jersey desires a world-class transportation system, then we must provide the agencies with the tools necessary to reduce costs, generate revenue, and efficiently start and complete projects. The delivery of transportation services is not a one-size-fits-all undertaking. Projects come in different sizes, with different challenges, stakeholders, and available resources. This is why we must allow our agencies to have every possible option to execute their mandates.

The State must enable its transportation agencies to use innovative and effective methods to get large scale projects started and reduce long term costs. Large scale projects across the country are being built under alternative contract forms that have expedited construction and
reduced costs. Other methods being used successfully in the country are projects taking place under public-private-partnership agreements. There are too many projects that need funding and there is underutilized private capital available that could fill this need. Jumpstarting projects through this method, and others, means more economic activity taking place, more jobs, and delivering on services the public desires.

We must also begin to look at the long-term costs of projects. Too often, to save money in the short-term, contracts are awarded without significant regard to qualification and expertise. While this may mean a lower price today, it routinely means higher costs tomorrow through increased claims, change orders, and construction delays. This should be addressed through legislation strengthening qualifications-based selection for professional services procurement.

A fact of service delivery is that one must have the funding resources to provide it. All across the state, public investment in transportation infrastructure has created direct and measurable benefits for the private sector. Currently, the Municipal Land Use Law constrains the ability to account for these public investments that others are using to generate vast revenues. The Municipal Land Use Law should be reviewed to permit flexibility to the state and municipalities to explore alternate revenue sources from entities directly benefitting from the investments made to the transportation system. This would not only help the state and municipalities pay for necessary projects but would also assist in maintaining a state-of-good-repair on transportation infrastructure that will help increase home and land values and further sustain the benefits to the private entities long term as well.

Value capture financing is another tool that should be explored to support public and private investment in transportation infrastructure. The State, either through legislation or working directly with the private sector, would require a payment in return for the value that the publicly financed transportation infrastructure investment is generating for the private entity. Another potential area to explore, in the same vein as value capture financing and seldom used in New Jersey, would be to engage municipalities in tax incremental financing plans. These agreements must be done carefully and protect all involved, however, they can play a role in getting dormant projects started and completed. The anticipated increase in property values and increased tax collections over a predetermined amount of time would have a portion placed into a dedicated fund, which would then be used to fund the project.

Providing new tools are just part of the answer. An emphasis must also be placed on abilities the agencies do have, and can control right now, but have not fully capitalized on. New Jersey Transit has some of the most valuable real estate and air rights in New Jersey, and a captive audience of thousands at some of its stations each day. An aggressive plan should be put in place to make sure the agency is maximizing potential concession and advertising agreements and is using their land efficiently in conjunction with municipalities and developers to increase revenue.

iii. **Recommendation: Provide new leadership for promotion of road and rail safety and efficiency**

Enhancement of service to the public is also the ability to provide for the safety and wellbeing of the state’s residents across all modes of transportation. Filling the position of Director of Highway Traffic Safety will enable the state to implement proven behavioral counter measures in support of the Zero Fatalities goal. Additionally, New Jersey gave back approximately $20 million in federal safety infrastructure funding this past year, due to a lack of prioritization and coordination in establishing projects for its use. This is lost money the state cannot afford to give away. The commissioner should task a senior level individual with
overseeing this program to make sure the funds are used and necessary projects are undertaken, and no funding is left on the table.

Another focus for the leadership of NJ Transit must be the deployment of positive train control technology throughout New Jersey Transit’s system. This technology has been mandated by Congress and all the states must have it fully installed by December 31, 2018. According to a recent report, New Jersey Transit has equipped just 25 of its 440 railcars for the technology, installed 24 of its 124 towers that need it, and have provided training to 137 of its 1,100 employees that need it. To date, none of the 326 miles of track under its control have the system in operation. Failure to meet the deadline, and in the absence of a second federal extension, New Jersey Transit faces fines of up to $25,000 per day for each violation.

Another technology that deserves executive attention is the expanded deployment of adaptive traffic signaling. Its deployment in urban centers and critical corridors would improve congestion and reduce commuting times.

Implementation will require outreach to the legislature and engagement with municipalities and other key stakeholders who fear changes to the status quo. Part of this engagement must be illustrating how these changes will produce more projects being undertaken system wide and increase the value of assets for all parties involved.

Costs: The costs associated with most of these recommendations are minimal and have the potential to provide long term savings. Opening up potential new revenue streams will further reduce costs associated with these recommendations and others throughout the report. A potential high cost to the state will be the fines New Jersey Transit must pay if the agency does not meet the deadline to install the positive train control system.

IV. PRIORITY: APPOINT AN EMERGENCY MANAGER AT NEW JERSEY TRANSIT TASKED WITH BOLSTERING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AMTRAK

i. Recommendation: Appoint an emergency manager to oversee the global relationship with Amtrak and to ensure the state’s interests are properly addressed

New Jersey leases the right to operate on Amtrak’s tracks. Part of this lease is the expectation that Amtrak will keep their system in a state-of-good-repair. However, often New Jersey Transit and its 200,000 daily commuters suffer from delays caused by Amtrak.

The emergency manager would be charged with several negotiable aspects to the New Jersey Transit – Amtrak relationship.

First, New Jersey Transit is withholding $120 million in lease payments for Amtrak’s failure to keep the system at an acceptable level. The emergency manager will need to put a plan in place outlining the conditions that need to be met by Amtrak before the $120 million is transferred over to them. Furthermore, as part of future payments, additional measurable performance objectives should be created that Amtrak must meet to receive payments.

Second, the emergency manager would work with Amtrak on day-to-day operations, safety programs, and cost responsibilities.

Third, the emergency manager would determine where the cost allocations in New Jersey Transit’s Northeast Corridor agreement with Amtrak should be revisited. In addition, the emergency manager would engage Amtrak to work towards an arrangement to allow New
Jersey Transit to have a broader role in management of the Northeast Corridor, including Penn Station, New York.

Lastly, in conjunction with the Governor, the emergency manager would reengage the transit agencies from the states along the Northeast Corridor line to initiate a working group that would combine the advocacy powers of the states to press Amtrak for system improvements.

To implement this, an individual with a deep knowledge of New Jersey Transit and its symbiotic relationship with Amtrak will need to be identified and empowered to carry out the needed objectives of the emergency manager. It may be best for the executive director of NJ Transit to assume the proposed emergency manager’s responsibilities as well.

Costs: There will be a cost when New Jersey Transit eventually pays Amtrak the owed $120 million. Hopefully, the emergency manager will ultimately improve customer delivery and service and create long-term savings through the greater role New Jersey Transit would have in planning and operations of the Northeast Corridor line.

V. PRIORITY: EMPHASIZE TRANSPARENCY TO IMPROVE CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE AND TO DEMONSTRATE VALUE OF SYSTEM INVESTMENTS

i. **Recommendation:** Direct all agency websites and apps be rebuilt to emphasize transparency through streaming and archiving live proceedings, the creation of a project dashboard, and providing real time information of public interest.

The increase in transparency of agency websites and apps will lead to increased accountability and eventually a greater trust among the public that their tax and fare dollars are being spent wisely to bolster the system.

Too often, major decisions take place behind closed doors and even when agency boards do meet in public, those meetings tend to be difficult for the average citizen to attend. The improvements should enable citizens to live stream all board meetings and access archived hearings as well.

In addition to the streaming and archiving of board meetings, the public deserves to know where their dollars are going. The most visible sign to residents of improvements in the transportation system are the various projects around the state that they know they are funding. A project dashboard should be created to allow easy access to project information such as the scope of each project, the amount of money allocated, construction timelines and delays, and real-time expenditures that have taken place on the project. The project dashboard would provide a forum for the state to build trust and accountability with the public. The public knows the fares, tolls and taxes they pay for the system and this will provide a detailed look into what they are getting for it.

Building trust with the public will also entail providing information that customers of the system need to plan their commutes. Upgrades should include the ability for customers to easily access route specific on-time performance for all transit routes, real-time transit and traffic incidents and delays, and safety data detailing crash and fatality information, by route, for all modes of transportation.
ii. **Recommendation:** Implement an electronic data records transfer system to expedite access to crash data across agencies and empower project planners and law enforcement agencies to effectively identify high risk areas and allocate resources effectively.

The State will need to take further steps to provide some of the information the public deserves to know. Implementation of an electronic records data transfer system will enable incident reports to seamlessly be transferred across agencies and uploaded for the public. This information is not only helpful to customers to plan their day, but also this system would be able to detail improvements that have been made to high risk locations by the data comparison that can easily be carried out after safety infrastructure improvements take place and reallocation of law enforcement resources have been applied.

The State will need to take steps to review the Department of Transportation’s relationship with the Office of Information Technology and require that a greater focus is placed on the Department’s systems. Additionally, New Jersey can review how other states are already offering these services and use their experiences as a guide on upgrading the systems. Finally, the state should take steps to revitalize use of the Access Management Code permitting process.

Costs: There will be costs to pursuing these recommendations as there are with any technology overhaul.
The Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and the entire senior transition team staff greatly appreciate the immense amount of work, participation and expertise that all our co-chairs, committee members and deputy directors who staffed each committee provided since the transition began in November. This hard work and positive energy about how New Jersey can once again become a national leader has resulted in a robust set of recommended priorities and actions for the incoming administration to consider. As with any collaborative endeavor, many recommendations and opinions were expressed and debated during the committee meetings and the drafting of the reports by co-chairs, committee members, and Deputy Directors. The final reports may contain recommendations that do not reflect the concurrence of all co-chairs or committee members, nor of the organizations they represent. These reports are purely advisory and do not reflect the positions of the Governor-elect or any other elected official.