NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
HIGHER EDUCATION

To:	New Jersey Institutions of Higher Education
From:	New Jersey Office of the Secretary of Higher Education, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness
Date:	July 9, 2025
Subject:	Recent Federal Inquiries into Foreign Engagements and Access to Sensitive Research at U.S. Universities

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In recent months, a number of U.S. universities have received inquiries from the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Committee on Education and Workforce. These inquiries have primarily focused on universities' partnerships with Chinese institutions and the involvement of foreign nationals in sensitive research areas. The inquiries aim to assess potential risks to U.S. national security and research integrity.

The letters sent to institutions such as Harvard University, Duke University, Stanford University, and the University of Michigan outline several concerns:

1. **Collaborations with Chinese Institutions:** The inquiries highlight partnerships with Chinese universities and joint institutes that may facilitate the transfer of sensitive technologies to China, potentially aiding in its military capabilities.
2. **Foreign National Involvement in Research:** Concerns are raised about the involvement of Chinese nationals in federally funded research, especially in fields with military or dual-use applications.
3. **Compliance with U.S. Sanctions and Export Control Laws:** The inquiries seek information on how universities ensure compliance with U.S. laws prohibiting certain engagements with blacklisted foreign entities.

The rationale behind these inquiries includes:

- **National Security Concerns:** The potential for sensitive research and technologies developed in the U.S. to be transferred to foreign adversaries, enhancing their military and technological capabilities.
- **Intellectual Property Theft:** The risk of espionage and unauthorized sharing of research findings with foreign governments.
- **Regulatory Compliance:** Ensuring that universities adhere to U.S. laws and regulations regarding foreign collaborations and export controls.

The Office of the Secretary of Higher Education (OSHE) and the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness (NJOHSP) offer the following recommended actions for New Jersey universities and colleges to proactively prepare for any potential inquiries:

1. Review Foreign Collaborations: Conduct a thorough review of existing partnerships with foreign institutions, particularly those in China, to assess any potential risks or compliance issues.
2. Enhance Compliance Programs: Strengthen compliance programs related to export controls, sanctions, and research security. Ensure that all faculty and staff are aware of these regulations.
3. Monitor Foreign National Participation: Implement monitoring mechanisms to track the involvement of foreign nationals in sensitive research projects, especially those funded by the U.S. Department of Defense or other federal agencies.
4. Update Security Protocols: Regularly update security protocols for research projects, including data protection measures and access controls.
5. Engage with Legal and Security Experts: Consult with legal and security experts to ensure all foreign engagements and research activities comply with U.S. laws and regulations.
6. Prepare for Inquiries: Be ready to provide documentation and testimony regarding foreign collaborations if requested by federal entities.

By taking these proactive steps, New Jersey's state-funded universities and colleges can better protect their research integrity, ensure compliance with U.S. laws, and safeguard national security interests.

Please note, these letters for testimony and/or answers to Requests for Information (RFI) typically allow for a 14-day compliance deadline. OSHE is encouraging these steps be taken proactively as opposed to reactively.

OSHE and NJOHSP suggest that the above recommendations be undertaken with an emphasis on transparency and with a goal of the preservation of our academic integrity and public trust.

If you require guidance or recommendations regarding best practices as it relates to foreign engagements, particularly with countries considered high-risk by the U.S. Department of State, NJOHSP stands ready to assist. You can call 609-584-4000 or email notify@njohsp.gov.

Please see attached examples of letters from Congress to Stanford University and the University of Detroit Mercy.

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

March 18, 2025

Dr. Jonathan Levin
President
Stanford University
450 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

Dear Dr. Levin,

The United States is at a dangerous crossroads where the pursuit of short-term financial gains by academic institutions jeopardizes long-term global technological leadership and national security. Our nation's universities, long regarded as the global standard for excellence and innovation, are increasingly used as conduits for foreign adversaries to illegally gain access to critical research and advanced technology. Nonetheless, too many U.S. universities continue to prioritize financial incentives over the education of American students, domestic workforce development and national security. They do so by admitting large numbers of Chinese nationals into advanced STEM programs, potentially at the expense of qualified Americans. Accordingly, we write to request information regarding your university's policies and oversight mechanisms concerning the enrollment of Chinese national undergraduate, graduate, and PhD students, their involvement in federally funded research, and the security of sensitive technologies developed on campus.

The significant tuition revenue generated by international students—many of whom pay full tuition—has caused elite universities to become financially dependent on foreign enrollment, particularly from China.[1] This reliance on foreign students, especially those from adversarial nations, raises serious concerns about the displacement of American talent, the outsourcing of expertise, and the long-term implication for U.S. technological leadership and economic security. The intelligence community has warned that American campuses are "soft targets" for espionage and intellectual property theft.[2] The U.S. Department of Justice has further raised concerns that "international students' motives aren't just to learn but to share that intelligence with foreign

[1] *See* House Cmte. on Foreign Affairs, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Threat to American Universities (July 7, 2020).
[2] Ken Dilanian, *American universities are a soft target for China's spies, say U.S. intelligence officials*, NBC News (Feb. 2020).

superpowers to see a competitive advantage."[3] These warnings make clear that this issue is not merely economic. It is a matter of national security. As China aggressively pursues dominance in strategic industries, the unchecked enrollment of Chinese nationals in American institutions risks facilitating the technological transfers that strengthen Beijing's military and economic competitiveness at our nation's expense.

The large influx of Chinese national students into the United States presents a growing national security challenge. Each year, hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals study in the United States, with some gaining access to cutting-edge research in fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors, and aerospace engineering.[4] One third of all foreign graduate students studying STEM fields at U.S. universities are Chinese nationals.[5] Some of these students are directly linked to Chinese state-backed funding sources, government talent recruitment programs, and research institutions tied to China's military-industrial complex.[6] Simply put, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has established a well-documented, systematic pipeline to embed researchers in leading U.S. institutions, providing them direct exposure to sensitive technologies with dual-use military applications.

According to a study conducted by Harvard University, only 25% of Chinese graduate students intend to immigrate to the United States or another Western country after completing their graduate programs.[7] More concerning, however, is that nearly half remain in the United States only temporarily for post-graduate employment before returning to China; and 25% of the students intend to return to China immediately after graduation.[8] This pattern raises significant concerns about the extent to which Chinese nationals, after gaining expertise in highly advanced fields, ultimately transfer knowledge back to China.

The brain drain of critical expertise is not a coincidence but a reflection of Beijing's explicit strategy to leverage academia for technological advancement. The CCP's talent recruitment programs actively incentivize students and researchers to return to China and apply their acquired skills in ways that directly benefit the regime's economic and military ambitions. As a result, U.S. universities serve as training grounds for China's technological ascendance. Without stronger protections, American academic institutions risk facilitating the very innovation that the Chinese government seeks to use to outcompete and surpass the United States.

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[3] Alex Caprariello, *Have Chinese spies infiltrated US college campuses?*, NewsNation (Feb. 7, 2023).
[4] Aline Barros, *Chinese Still Largest Group of Foreign Students in U.S.*, Voice of America (Dec. 21, 2023).
[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-23-106114, Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data, (Nov. 15, 2022).
[6] *See* Senate Perm. Select Subcmte. on Investigations, Threats to the U.S. Research Enterprise: China's Talent Recruitment Plans (Nov. 19, 2022); Federal Bureau of Investigation, The China Threat: Chinese Talent Plans Encourage Trade Secret Theft, Economic Espionage (2024); U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Comm., Overseas Chinese Students and Scholars in China's Drive for Innovation (Oct. 7, 2020).
[7] Richard Yarrow & Victoria Li, *Chinese Graduate Students' Experience of U.S. Higher Education Through Covid and U.S.-China Tensions*, Harvard Kennedy School (Aug. 2024).
[8] *Id.*

A September 2024 joint report from the House Select Committee on China and House Committee on Education and Workforce revealed several instances where American researchers, benefiting from federally funded programs, have enabled China to achieve significant technological advancements in critical and emerging technologies.[9] The committees found that this has often led to the transfer of dual-use technologies pivotal to China's strategic objectives, including artificial intelligence and semiconductor research.[10] By failing to retain these skilled individuals or admit students more likely to remain in the country, U.S. universities inadvertently act as incubators for China's technological and military advancements.

America's student visa system has become a Trojan horse for Beijing, providing unrestricted access to our top research institutions and posing a direct threat to our national security. If left unaddressed, this trend will continue to displace American talent, compromise research integrity, and fuel China's technological ambitions at our expense. Therefore, we respectfully request that you provide written responses to the following requests for information and questions as soon as possible but no later than April 1, 2025:

Request for information:

1. Provide a list of all universities that Chinese national students at your university previously attended, including their research affiliations.

2. Specify the sources of tuition funding for these individuals (e.g., personal wealth scholarships, Chinese talent recruitment programs, Chinese government grants).

3. Identify the type of research Chinese national students are conducting and the programs they are participating in at your university.

4. List all university programs that include Chinese national participants, along with the sources of funding for these programs.

5. Provide a list of laboratories and research initiatives where Chinese national students currently work.

6. Provide a country-by-country breakdown of applicants, admittances, and enrollments at your university.

[9] House Select Cmte. on China & House Cmte. on Ed. and Workforce, *CCP on the Quad: How American Taxpayers and Universities Fund the CCP's Advanced Military and Technological Research* (Sep. 2024).
[10] *Id.*

Questions:

1. What percentage of the university's total graduate student body consists of Chinese nationals?

2. What percentage of the graduate program's total tuition revenue comes from Chinese nationals?

3. What percentage of Chinese graduate students are engaged in federally funded research projects?

4. Does your university have policies in place to prevent foreign nationals from working on projects tied to U.S. government grants (e.g., Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, National Science Foundation funded research)?

5. Have Chinese nationals worked on federally funded research?

6. Does the university have monitoring mechanisms to track foreign students' participation in research with military or dual-use applications?

7. What collaborations exist between university faculty and China-based institutions or research laboratories?

8. Have any Chinese graduate students disclosed participation in China-backed recruitment and talent programs, government grants, or corporate-backed funding initiatives?

9. Are there restrictions on Chinese nationals enrolling in export-controlled coursework (e.g., advanced semiconductor engineering, quantum computing, AI, and aerospace engineering)?

10. What percentage of Chinese graduates from your university remain in the United States, and what percentage return to China?

11. Are Chinese nationals disproportionately concentrated in high-tech fields such as AI, quantum computing, robotics, aerospace, and semiconductors?

12. Are there any background screening processes for Chinese nationals applying to sensitive research programs?

13. Do any faculty members maintain research ties with Chinese institutions or researchers? If so, which universities and/or researchers in China?

14. How many Chinese STEM graduates return to China, and what industries or institutions do they typically join (e.g., Huawei, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, Aviation Industry Corporation of China, etc.)?

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States under H. Res. 5 Sec. 4(a).

Thank you for your attention to the important matter and we appreciate your prompt and full reply.

Sincerely,

John Moolenaar
Chairman
House Select Committee on the CCP

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

February 18, 2025

President Donald B. Taylor
University of Detroit Mercy
4001 W. McNichols Road
Detroit, MI 48221

Dear President Taylor:

We write to express concerns regarding the University of Detroit Mercy's (Detroit Mercy) strategic partnerships with four Chinese institutions—Hubei University of Technology, Yancheng Institute of Technology, Beijing University of Chemical Technology, and Anhui Polytechnic University—and the joint educational programs established under these collaborations, including the Detroit Green Technology Institute in the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] The research at your university is funded by the American people and must be protected. The PRC systematically exploits the open research environment in the United States, actively engaging in theft, espionage, and other hostile actions against U.S. universities perpetrated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We urge you to terminate these partnerships in light of the facts below.

In a recently published report, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party and the Committee on Education and Workforce identified significant risks to the integrity of the U.S. academic research enterprise emanating from the PRC.[2] The report documented numerous cases in which PRC

[1] *Beijing University of Chemical Technology and University of Detroit Mercy Joint Undergraduate Program in Mechanical Design, Manufacturing, and Automation [北京化工大学与美国底特律大学合作举办机械设计制造及其自动化专业本科教育项目]*, Ministry of Education Foreign Affairs Supervision Information Network [教育部教育涉外监管信息网], *available at https://web.archive.org/web/20250201210933/https://www.crs.jsj.edu.cn/aproval/detail/1094; Anhui Polytechnic University and University of Detroit Mercy Joint Undergraduate Program in Electrical Engineering and Automation [安徽工程大学与美国底特律大学合作举办电气工程及其自动化专业本科教育项目],* Ministry of Education Foreign Affairs Supervision Information Network [教育部教育涉外监管信息网], *available at https://web.archive.org/web/20250201180000/https://www.crs.jsj.edu.cn/aproval/detail/1873; Yancheng Institute of Technology and University of Detroit Mercy Joint Undergraduate Program in Vehicle Engineering [盐城工学院与美国底特律大学合作举办车辆工程专业本科教育项目],* Ministry of Education Foreign Affairs Supervision Information Network [教育部教育涉外监管信息网], *available at https://web.archive.org/web/20250201180609/https://www.crs.jsj.edu.cn/aproval/detail/949; Detroit Green Technology Institute, Hubei University of Technology [湖北工业大学底特律绿色工业学院],* Ministry of Education Foreign Affairs Supervision Information Network [教育部教育涉外监管信息网], *available at https://web.archive.org/web/20250201175419/https://www.crs.jsj.edu.cn/aproval/detail/2572.*

[2] United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party and Committee on Education and the Workforce, *CCP on the Quad: How American Taxpayers*

defense affiliated institutions leveraged the expertise and capabilities of American researchers—often developed with federal research funding—to enable the CCP to achieve significant technological advancements in critical and emerging technologies with defense applications.[3] It specifically identifies U.S.-PRC academic joint institutes as a core channel leveraged by the PRC government and its affiliated entities through which sensitive U.S. technologies and research know-how are transferred to the PRC's defense and research industrial base.

In response to the report's publication, both Georgia Institute of Technology and University of California, Berkeley have decided to shutter their joint institutes with PRC academic institutions. Additionally, the University of Michigan began the process of ending its joint institute after receiving Chairman Moolenaar's letter outlining similar concerns last fall.[4] Following these precedents, we encourage Detroit Mercy likewise to end its partnerships with these four Chinese institutions.

Detroit Mercy's partnerships with PRC institutions raise grave national security concerns, particularly in light of the university's significant federal funding and privileged research designations. Since 2020, the Department of Defense has invested over $1.6 million in Detroit Mercy's Metro Detroit Regional Vehicle Cybersecurity Institute.[5] The university has held the designation of a National Center of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defense (NCAE-CD) from the National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security since 2004; this distinction is awarded to institutions that "prepare, grow, and sustain a national cybersecurity workforce that safeguards and promotes America's national security and economic prosperity."[6]

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and Universities Fund the CCP's Advanced Military and Technological Research (Oct. 7, 2024), *available at* selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/reports/ccp-quad-how-american-taxpayers-and-universities-fund-ccps-advanced-military-and.

[3] *Id*.

[4] Letter from John Moolenaar, Chairman, United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, to Santa Ono, President, University of Michigan (Oct. 31, 2024), *available at* https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-10-31%20-%20Letter%20to%20U-M%20re%20Research%20Security%20House%20Select%20Cmte%20CCP.pdf; Press Release, United States House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, University of Michigan to End Joint Institute with Chinese University (Jan. 10, 2025), *available at* https://selectcommitteeontheccp.house.gov/media/press-releases/university-michigan-end-joint-institute-chinese-university#:~:text=U%2DM%20is%20the%20third%20American,concerns%20about%20national%20security%20risks.

[5] Press Release, University of Detroit Mercy, U.S. Department of Defense Awards UDM-Led Cybersecurity Consortium $497,080 in Sustainment Funding (Jan. 30, 2024), *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250201182230/https://www.udmercy.edu/about/news/articles/2024/01-30-dod-awards-udm-led-vehicle-cybersecurity-institute.php.

[6] *Center for Cyber Intelligence Studies*, University of Detroit Mercy, *available at* https://chass.udmercy.edu/academics/cis/center-for-cyber-intel-studies.php#:~:text=The%20Center%20for%20Cyber%20Security,by%20the%20National%20Security%20Agency; Press Release, National Security Agency, NSA Announces the Designation of Centers of Academic Excellence in Information, *available at* https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/1635619/nsa-announces-the-designation-of-centers-of-academic-excellence-in-information/; *Unclassified CAE CD Designation Requirements*, Department of Defense, *available at* https://dl.dod.cyber.mil/wp-content/uploads/cae/pdf/unclass-cae-cd_designation_requirements.pdf.

Moreover, Detroit Mercy has received nearly $2.5 million in funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF) since 2020.[7] These federal investments reflect a strategic expectation that the university will uphold the highest standards of security and vigilance in protecting sensitive research from foreign adversaries, particularly those with demonstrated intent to undermine U.S. national interests.

Despite this trust and federal support, Detroit Mercy has established and maintained partnerships with PRC institutions tied to its military-industrial complex. In 2014 and 2015, the university launched dual degree programs with Beijing University of Chemical Technology,[8] Yancheng Institute of Technology,[9] and Anhui Polytechnic University[10]—all of which have

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[7] *Awards Simple Search*, National Science Foundation, *available at* https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/.

[8] The Beijing University of Chemical Technology (BUCT) operates under joint oversight from China's Education Ministry and the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) since 2016. With classified defense clearance, its National Defense Research Centre develops critical military materials including carbon fiber. Defense funding increased significantly, rising 50% to $43M between 2011-2015. The university's military connections are further evidenced by its vice president's previous role in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) signals intelligence unit, which later merged into the Strategic Support Force in 2016. See *Beijing University of Chemical Technology was selected as a university jointly established by the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense and the Ministry of Education [北京化工大学入选国家国防科技工业局、教育部共建高校]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190806034129/http://news.buct.edu.cn/kxyj/72411.htm; *Beijing University of Chemical Technology Academic Committee 2017 Annual Report [北京化工大学学术委员会 2017 年年度报告]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190815023933/http://xxgk.buct.edu.cn/docs/2018-10/20181009164958213789.pdf; *About the Academy [关于学院]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190815024021/http://www.cmse.buct.edu.cn/gyxy/xygk/xyls/100164.htm; *The signing and awarding ceremony of the joint training base for professional degree postgraduates of our school was held at the China Aviation Technology Research Institute [我校专业学位研究生联合培养基地签约暨授牌仪式在中国航空综合技术研究所举行]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学] (June 4, 2019), *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190929233720/http://cist.buct.edu.cn/xwzx/xyxw/120655.htm; *Chen Dongsheng [陈冬生]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190806041006/http://www.buct.edu.cn/yblm/zjbh/ldjt/22903.htm; Research Center Introduction [研究中心简介], Advanced Elastomer Materials Research Center [先进弹性体材料研究中心], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190806040244/http://www.caem.buct.edu.cn/zxgk/zxjj/index.htm; *Beijing University of Chemical Technology's 13th Five-Year Development Plan [北京化工大学"十三五"发展规划]*, Beijing University of Chemical Technology [北京化工大学] (June 2016), *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20190806035001/http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HLqIKFN2aUkJ:www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A08/gjs_left/s7187/zsgxgz_sswgh/201703/W020170310547097800849.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au.

[9] The Yancheng Institute of Technology advances China's military capabilities through its technology transfer center in Yannan High-tech Zone, specializing in dual-use AI, energy, and environmental technologies. The institute maintains 6 provincial platforms and has incubated 37 companies with $16.1M in revenue. Its military-civil fusion efforts are supported by research facilities including the Intelligent Systems and Control Research Institute, Optoelectronic Information Technology Institute, and Micro-Nano Functional Materials Institute. See *Yancheng Institute of Technology*, Baidu, *available at* https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%9B%90%E5%9F%8E%E5%B7%A5%E5%AD%A6%E9%99%A2/1637931.

[10] Anhui Polytechnic University is deeply integrated into the PRC's military-industrial complex through laboratories such as the Key Laboratory of Advanced Perception and Intelligent Control of High-end Equipment and the Electric Drive and Control Key Laboratory, both critical in developing autonomous systems, missile technology, and other dual-use innovations. See *Anhui University of Technology & University of Detroit 4+1 Master's Program [安徽工*

documented connections to the PRC's military. During this period, Detroit Mercy secured over $500,000 in NSF funding for its Robotics and Mechatronics Systems Engineering (RMSE) program.[11] University documents explicitly confirm that this funding made the PRC partnerships possible: "Mechatronics and Robotics courses, and the subsequent launch of the RMSE major were the reasons why the China program was possible."[12]

Through these programs, Chinese students in Robotics and Mechatronic Systems, Mechanical Engineering, and Electrical Engineering and Automation spend three years studying in the PRC before transferring to Detroit Mercy for their senior year and master's degrees. This gives them direct access to "state-of-the-art labs such as the Center for Automotive Systems Engineering Education," exposing them to advanced technologies with clear dual-use potential.[13] Furthermore, Detroit Mercy faculty have been "traveling to China to teach some of the courses in

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程大学 & 美国底特律大学 4+1硕士合作培养项目], Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学] *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250207162605/https://www.ahpu.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/e3/55/020e63cc4592b5763e1239a38555/3e0e0261-cef7-437d-b594-0f927db6aa49.docx; *Tianbo High-end Equipment Advanced Perception and Intelligent Control Key Laboratory Fund Application Guide [天博高端装备先进感知与智能控制重点实验室基金申请指南]*, Tianbo Sports Official Platform [天博体育官方平台], https://web.archive.org/web/20250202213518/https://m.yue-jin.com/tianboxinwen/44.html; *The construction of the key laboratory of the Ministry of Education for "Advanced Perception and Intelligent Control of High-end Equipment" passed the acceptance ["高端装备先进感知与智能控制" 教育部重点实验室建设通过验收]*, Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250202214609/https://www.ahpu.edu.cn/2024/1117/c3a234586/page.htm; Laboratory Introduction [实验室简介], Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250202214836/https://cee.ahpu.edu.cn/lapic/sysjj/list.htm*; Research Platforms [科研平台]*, Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250202215305/https://cee.ahpu.edu.cn/lapic/kypt/list.psp; *Research Projects [科研项目]*, Anhui Polytechnic University [安徽工程大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250202215626/https://cee.ahpu.edu.cn/lapic/kyxm/list.htm.

[11] Nat'l Sci. Found., *Scholarships for Robotics and Mechatronics Systems Engineering*, FAIN 1458496, awarded to Univ. of Detroit Mercy (Sept. 1, 2015–Aug. 31, 2020), *available at* https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1458496; Shuvra Das, *Experiences of Students Supported by an NSF S-STEM Grant in a Robotics and Mechatronic Systems Engineering Program*, in Proc. of the 2022 ASEE Annual Conference & Exposition, Minneapolis, MN, June 26–29, 2022, DOI: 10.18260/1-2--41359.

[12] The principal investigator on this federally funded project was credited with building a "thriving partnership for student recruitment with several universities in China." See *Krishnan, Mohan N., Ph.D.*, University of Detroit Mercy, https://libraries.udmercy.edu/archives/special-collections/index.php?collectionCode=honors_hon&record_id=832; *Dr. Shuvra Das - University of Detroit Mercy*, University of Detroit Mercy, https://web.archive.org/web/20250201212448/https://www.udmercy.edu/about/people/university/ces/mechanical/das-shuvra.

[13] *Detroit Mercy Partners with Prestigious Institutions in China for Engineering Education*, University of Detroit Mercy Alumni (Aug. 3, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20250201154145/https://sites.udmercy.edu/alumni/2017/08/03/detroit-mercy-partners-with-prestigious-institutions-in-china-for-engineering-education/.

the program,"[14] some while receiving federal funding,[15] further increasing the possibility of sensitive knowledge transfer. While the university boasts of its growing "name recognition in China," these benefits come at great economic and national security costs to the American people.[16]

These troubling partnerships expanded in 2019 with the launch of the Detroit Green Technology Institute at Hubei University of Technology, where a CCP committee oversees the Joint Institute's research direction and faculty appointments alongside mandatory CCP study sessions and loyalty pledges.[17] The university's Confidentiality Level 2 clearance enables classified weapons research, while its collaboration with Hubei Space Technology Academy advances missile technologies.[18] Most recently, in 2024, Detroit Mercy explored partnerships with Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, one of the PRC's "Seven Sons of National Defense," a group of universities specializing in military research.[19]

Collectively, these four partnerships create pipelines that expose federally funded research, facilities, and talent to exploitation by the CCP. This is not a benign academic exchange. It is a concerning example of U.S. tax dollars funding the PRC's military ambitions and technologies that could be used against our country.

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[14] *Detroit Mercy Partners with Prestigious Institutions in China for Engineering Education*, University of Detroit Mercy Alumni (Aug. 3, 2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20250201154145/https://sites.udmercy.edu/alumni/2017/08/03/detroit-mercy-partners-with-prestigious-institutions-in-china-for-engineering-education/.

[15] In 2019, faculty taught *Introduction to Robotics* in China while receiving NSF funding for *Robotics and Mechatronics Systems Engineering* (2015–2022), with additional federal funding active from 2014–2017. See Nat'l Sci. Found., *Scholarships for Robotics and Mechatronics Systems Engineering*, Award No. 1458496, Univ. of Detroit Mercy (Sept. 1, 2015–Aug. 31, 2022), *available at* https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1458496&HistoricalAwards=false.

[16] *Detroit Mercy Partners with Prestigious Institutions in China for Engineering Education*, University of Detroit Mercy Alumni, (Aug. 3, 2017), *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250201154145/https://sites.udmercy.edu/alumni/2017/08/03/detroit-mercy-partners-with-prestigious-institutions-in-china-for-engineering-education/.

[17] Specifically, in Article 21 of HBUT's charter, it states: "学校党委是学校的领导核心." See *Hubei University of Technology Charter [湖北工业大学章程]*, Hubei University of Technology [湖北工业大学], *available at* https://web.archive.org/web/20250131213332/https://www.hbut.edu.cn/xxgk/xxzc.htm. For an example of the study sessions, see *Detroit Green Industry College holds a Party Discipline Study and Education Reading Class (First Session) [底特律绿色工业学院举行党纪学习教育读书班（第一期）],* Detroit Green Industry College, Hubei University of Technology [湖北工业大学底特律绿色工业学院] (Apr. 30, 2024), https://green.hbut.edu.cn/info/1124/3261.htm.

[18] General Designing Institute of Hubei Space Tech. Acad., *General Advanced Upper Stage of Solid Launch Vehicle*, CN105841556B (filed Feb. 25, 2016, issued Apr. 12, 2017), https://patents.google.com/patent/CN105841556B/en; *About University*, Hubei University of Technology, https://www.digiedupro.com/hubei-university-of-technology/; *School Introduction [学校简介]*, Hubei University of Technology [湖北工业大学], https://web.archive.org/web/20250131212913/https://www.hbut.edu.cn/xxgk/xxjj.htm.

[19] *Professor Leo E. Hanifin, Dean of the College of Engineering and Science at the University of Detroit, Visits Our School [美国底特律大学工程与科学学院院长Leo E. Hanifin教授访问我校]*, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics [南京航空航天大学] (Oct. 21, 2011), http://newsweb.nuaa.edu.cn/2011/1021/c738a28188/pagem.htm.

Given Detroit Mercy's NCAE-CD status and extensive federal funding from the Department of Defense and the NSF, the university's partnerships with PRC military-linked institutions represent an unacceptable national security risk. The security of American technological advantages cannot be compromised. Accordingly, we urge you to end your PRC collaborations to prevent further PRC exploitation of U.S. research capabilities and taxpayer investments. The security of American technological advantages cannot be compromised.

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to investigate and submit policy recommendations on countering the economic, technological, security, and ideological threats of the Chinese Communist Party to the United States and allies and partners of the United States under H. Res. 5 Sec. 4(a).

The Committee on Education and Workforce has legislative and oversight jurisdiction over "education or labor generally" under House Rule X.

Thank you for your prompt attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

John Moolenaar
Chairman
Select Committee on the CCP

Tim Walberg
Chairman
Committee on Education and Workforce