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Committee
Report on the New Jersey Naval Militia Joint Command (NJNMJC) to The
Adjutant General
Background
On January 14, 2004, the Governor signed P.L. 2004 c.300 requiring that “the
New
Jersey Department of Military and Veterans Affairs review the activities
of the New Jersey
Naval Militia Joint Command (NJNMJC) and determine whether a viable and
clearly defined
mission exists for that command.” That legislation also emphasized
the increasing importance of
ensuring that the roles of the various security and safety related agencies
are clearly defined to
facilitate coordination in the prevention of and response to emergencies.
The results of the
review, including a description of the activities of the NJNMJC and an
assessment of whether or
not the NJNMJC has a viable and clearly defined mission, were to be included
in a report
prepared by the Adjutant General (TAG). If it was concluded that such a
mission exists, the
report is to contain (1) an explanation of the mission and (2) specify
what personnel and material
assets are required to adequately fulfill the mission. If there is no such
mission, the report is to
include an explanation of why such a mission does not exist. The report
is to be submitted to the
Governor, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the General Assembly,
and the
Chairpersons of the Senate Law and Public Safety and Veterans’ Affairs,
Assembly Homeland
Security and State Preparedness and Assembly Military and Veterans’ Affairs
Committees.
The Naval Reserve of New Jersey was organized by an
act of the New Jersey Legislature
in 1895. The stated purpose of this organization was to defend the coast,
harbors, and waterfront
property. Following the passage of the Federal Naval Reserve Law of 1916,
the name was
changed to the Naval Militia of New Jersey. Ultimately, the unit evolved
into a brigade
composed of three divisions, each having several divisions. Members of
the Naval Militia fought in the Spanish-American War, World War I, and
World War II reaching a peak strength
of 3,590 during the Korean Conflict. By 1963, the command had been deactivated
and absorbed
into the U.S. Naval Reserve.
In a memorandum dated February 21, 1999, Governor Whitman
directed that the New
Jersey Naval Militia and the New Jersey State Guard be reactivated and
organized into a single
joint regiment to be designated as the New Jersey Naval Militia Joint
Command (NJNMJC).
However, unlike its predecessor, the NJNMJC was formed as a hybrid organization
with the 1st
Division being a true naval militia comprised of actively drilling naval
and Marine Corps
reservists, the 2nd Division performing as an operational Naval State
Guard, and the 3rd Division
providing support and auxiliary functions with multi-service state guard.
The concept of
operations differs from a traditional reserve or guard unit in that it
is based on volunteerism.
Essentially, each member is required to donate two days each month for
training or actual
missions in support of state and federal agencies. Additional mission
requirements could result
in being placed on state active duty with or without pay and allowances.
The primary purpose of this reconstituted unit was to
provide the Governor with a
military waterborne force, which would act as a force multiplier for
essential state and federal
missions. It was not intended to compete for missions, but rather to
augment and provide
capabilities where none existed previously. Following activation, the
NJNMJC participated in
several major events (e.g. Hurricane Floyd, OPSAIL 2000) and was employed
extensively in a
variety of roles after 9/11.
On September 11, 2001 members of the 2nd Division, New
Jersey Naval Militia,
assigned to Patron 10, placed one vessel, PBU 23-1, (Patrol Boat Utility),
a 23' aluminum
convention displacement hull with enclosed cabin, equipped with radar,
global positioning
device, depth indicator, marine hailer, VHS radio, and powered by twin
1989 outboard motors, at
the disposal of the United States Coast Guard and State Guard Units.
The vessel was deployed
for the purpose of security at and around the World Trade Center (WTC)
Site. During the weeks
following the disaster, a second vessel, PBU 23-2 was made available
to assist. A third vessel,
PBU 23-4, was placed in service in November 2001. The following is
a list of missions that
were accomplished from September 11, 2001 to July 30, 2002:
1. Waterborne security at the bases of the George Washington
Bridge
2. Daylight vessel traffic control on the Hudson River,
north of the
George Washington Bridge
3. Standby vessel for search and rescue detail Coast Guard Station
Sandy Hook, NJ
4. Transport of military personnel and equipment from NJ to North
Cove (Ground Zero)
5. V.I.P. transportation and security detail for Liberty State Park
tribute
events during October 2001
6. 192 days of water-borne security assisting naval personnel
at Naval
Weapons Station Earle
7. 180 days of continuous daylight patrols assisting the NJ State
Police at Salem
Nuclear Generating Station, Salem, NJ
8. Assisted with security in Jamaica Bay, NY during the aftermath
of the crash of Flight 194, Kennedy Airport
In addition, the following land-based missions were
assigned and accomplished:
1. Personnel to man the military Joint Operations Center
2. Chaplain services at Ground Zero and the Staten Island Logistics
Support Base
3. Development and presentation of an anthrax awareness program
to all N.J. Army
National Guard troops in the field
4. Physical security augmentation at Fort Dix and NAES Lakehurst
5. Logistical support at Ground Zero for the Disaster Medical
Assistance Team
(DMAT)
6. Warehouse management for the Salvation Army
In 2002, there were numerous issues that surfaced regarding
the structure and
organization of the NJNMJC. There were a number of allegations
of unfairness in the accession
process. At that time, the NJNMJC had never implemented regulations
as directed by Governor
Whitman in her memorandum. Accession criteria were not codified
as any official process
subjecting DMAVA and the State to potential liability. More importantly,
there is a lack of
comprehensive security or background checks (with the exception
of local municipal arrest
records), a lack of criteria regarding grade/rank assignments,
and no medical or fitness criteria.
A significant number of NJNMJC personnel had been on state active
duty since September 11,
2001, performing the previously cited operations. Almost $1.4
million and more than 8,100
mandays had been expended and additional workers compensation
dollars were spent for those
members who had incurred injuries.
Legal and organizational review found that the merging
of the two statutorily district
concepts (State Guard and Naval Militia), while not a violation
of New Jersey (N.J.S.A. 38A) or
federal statues (32 U.S.C.109) nevertheless, created confusion
regarding the role of members and
the potential ability to obtain federal recognition similar to
the New York model. In addition,
further legal review found that the activation of the NJNMJC
members in a State active duty
status ran contrary to guidance set forth in NGR 10-4 in that
the resources of the National Guard
were ready available prior to the activation of state defense
forces such as the State Guard.
Finally, for a 300+ member organization, almost one third were
assigned to the headquarters
staff in senior positions, thus requiring a comprehensive review
of the organization.
As a result, in April 2002, The Adjutant General ordered
that the NJNMJC stand down
accessions until such time regulations could be implemented.
Regulations had been drafted that
comply with all federal and state statutes as well as the new
threat environment. Those
regulations are pending the results of this study.
In the intervening period, the NJNMJC has been developing courses
and participating in the following training:
1. First Aid (2002)
2. WMD/Counterterrorism (2002-2003)
3. Professional Development Course (2003)
4. USCG Boating Safety/Team Coordination Course (2004)
5. Chief Petty Officer Development Course
a. April – May 2004
b. Mandatory for all E-7 through E-9
6. Basic Military Training (BMT)
a. Suspended until recruiting resumed
b. Includes IET, Militia Enlisted
Basic Indoctrination (MEBI), and Officer Basic
Indoctrination (OBI)
7. Community Emergency Response Training (CERT - 2004)
8. Incident Command System (ICS – 2005)
In order to accomplish this
review, The Adjutant General convened a NJNMJC Study Committee
consisting of members of the NJ Army and Air National Guard,
the NJNMJC, Homeland
Security, and the Joint Operations Center (J5/7). |
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